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Abstract: 
There have been no in depth studies of post Socialist transition in the Middle East. Syria’s 
experience is a useful one to explore given its historically important role in the region and its 
distinctive characteristics. The Syrian economic transition, from the early 1990s to 2011, was 
in two phases: an incremental liberalisation phase and a transition to Social Market 
Economy phase. During both phases, Syrian policy makers showed a preference for a 
gradualist approach to economic transition, rather than a big-bang approach. This was 
facilitated by oil revenues and subsidies from the Gulf States. The Syrian experience therefore 
has its own distinct characteristics, as well as elements in common with the transitions in 
other post Socialist economies.  
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Transition Economies in the Middle East: the Syrian Experience 
1. Introduction 
The primary idea of economic transition is to replace the institutions of a centrally planned 
economy with those of a market-based economy (Meyer, 2001; Newman, 2000). Institutions 
are ‘the rules of the game in a society’ which determine the incentives and barriers faced by 
economic players (North, 1990).
 
Studies which focus on transition economies require a 
certain level of understanding of their context. Since there have been no in depth studies of 
economic transition in the Middle East, Syria, which is a historically important country within 
this region, is an appropriate case study. 
From 8
th
 March 1963, the ruling Syrian Socialist Ba’th Party adopted Socialism as its 
ideology for the Syrian economy. However, fundamental problems in the Socialist economic 
policy started to appear and, as a result of these problems, a deep recession struck the Syrian 
economy during the 1980s. Initially, the Syrian government tried to implement incremental 
economic reforms in an attempt to obtain support from the private sector to overcome these 
problems. However, these attempts failed to make any significant improvements to the Syrian 
economy. Therefore, in 2005, the Syrian government decided to begin a transition to a Social 
Market Economy; a market-based economic model which stresses two major concepts: free 
market forces and social welfare issues (Raphaeli, 2007). 
The Syrian economic transition has been disrupted by an ongoing uprising against the 
government, which has been taking place since March 2011. The intensity of violence across 
the country has severely damaged the Syrian economy, which was estimated to have 
contracted by almost 19 percent in 2012 alone (PRS, 2014). Moreover, the success of the 
armed opposition in maintaining a strong presence in many strategic locations made the 
Syrian government more concerned about its survival than how to improve the country’s 
  
economy. As a result, the Syrian government has shifted its economic policy to finance the 
army and obtain public support by, for example, paying the wages of public sector employees 
even in areas under opposition control (PRS, 2014). 
Nevertheless a study of the Syrian experience as an economy in transition for twenty years 
since the early 1990s is helpful for achieving an understanding of similar contexts. Therefore, 
the paper explains the rationale for the Syrian government’s decision to move towards a 
market-based economy and its chosen path for the transition. This requires an explanation of 
the main characteristics and performance of its previous Socialist economy. Section 2 starts 
by explaining the Syrian economic experience under Socialist ideology. Section 3 explains 
the various events that triggered the economic transition. Section 4 outlines the Syrian 
government’s chosen approach to and path for Syria’s economic transition towards a market-
based economy. Some conclusions are outlined in Section 5. 
2. The Characteristics of the Syrian Economy under Socialist Ideology 
By the mid-1950s, Syria's post-independence capitalist expansion reached a point beyond 
which development seemed to require major social reforms and an increasing role for the 
state, which the Syrian agrarian-commercial bourgeoisie obstructed (Hinnebusch, 1995). In 
March 1963, the Syrian Socialist Ba’th Party, which grew out of this crisis, overthrew the old 
regime and seized power in Syria. Subsequently, it functioned as the only officially 
recognized political party in the country and adopted Socialism as its ideology for the Syrian 
economy (Hopfinger & Boeckler, 1996). 
The Ba’th party created a Leninist-like state which integrated those social forces that had 
either paid the costs or enjoyed few of the benefits of capitalist expansion - peasants, workers, 
rural minorities and intellectuals (Hinnebusch, 1990). Through nationalisations, land reform 
and government control over the market, the Syrian regime destroyed the economic bases of 
  
the bourgeoisie; the big latifundia were broken up and industrialists emigrated or quit their 
businesses (Hinnebusch, 1995). The Syrian version of Socialism, therefore, had much in 
common with those which existed in Communist countries. Its two main characteristics were 
central planning of most economic activities and bureaucratic control of economic 
organizations (Sukkar, 2003).
 
Central planning was introduced in Syria in 1963 in order to overcome some of the problems 
which were perceived to be caused by the capitalist system, such as instability in the supply 
and demand mechanism and a high rate of unemployment (Hinnebusch, 1997). Therefore, 
bureaucratic control replaced the supply-demand mechanism in Syria for most economic 
transactions in an attempt to achieve coordination among economic players, which were 
mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Ba’th party transferred private property to the 
public sector which became the core of the Syrian economy and the main engine of 
investment (Hopfinger & Boeckler, 1996). In the 1970s, much of nominally private 
agriculture was in state-dependent cooperatives - 85 percent of small peasants controlled one-
third of cultivated land (Hinnebusch, 1989). In industry, the public sector dwarfed a very 
large number of small and undercapitalised enterprises: 98 percent of the 40,000 private 
manufacturing enterprises employed less than ten workers. In 1984, the public sector 
employed one-third of the industrial labour force but produced 78 percent of gross output 
(Hinnebusch, 1995). 
Syria thus became one of the ‘centrally planned economies’ under which up to one third of 
the world’s population lived at one time (Peng, 2000). The direction of the Syrian economy 
was based on multiyear plans designed by the State Planning Commission, a national 
planning agency, which co-ordinated the activities of the SOEs (Ericson, 1991). Under Syrian 
Socialism, the decision to enter or exit from the market was taken by the State Planning 
  
Commission, which also decided on the annual scale and scope of production on behalf of the 
SOEs’ managers. Consequently, variety, quality or customer services and satisfaction were 
not considered by the SOEs’ managers, who were mainly production engineers or politicians 
appointed by the State Planning Commission and who functioned as implementers of orders, 
rather than as decision makers (Korani, 1992). 
State Socialism worked well initially because of the ready availability of basic education, 
jobs, health care and housing for the majority of the population during the 1960s and the 
1970s (Goulden, 2011). Indeed the gap between socialist and capitalist economies narrowed 
over the same period (Khanin, 2003; Weigl, 2008). Moreover, in the case of Syria, the 
economy was supported by financial assistance from Arab Gulf countries during the 1960s, in 
addition to growing oil revenues during the 1970s (Hinnebusch, 1997). However, this success 
did not last for long and problems caused by conceptual and implementation errors in Syrian 
Socialist economic policy started to appear (Sukkar, 2003). Syrian Socialism’s conceptual 
economic problems fell into two groups. 
First of all, there were Coordination Problems which were caused by extreme dependence on 
the State Planning Commission’s bureaucratic coordination of the economic activities of the 
SOEs (Ericson, 1991). This situation resulted in confusion and inconsistency because of the 
continuous revisions and adjustments to economic plans resulting from the State Planning 
Commission’s shortage of the information which was needed to build their plans on a realistic 
and correct basis, as is the situation in market-based systems (Naughton, 1996). Therefore, the 
State Planning Commission was incapable of providing coherent production plans for the 
dominant public sector and the output targets for the SOEs were always unrealistic. The 
appointment of unqualified managers to SOEs for political reasons, in addition to the rapid 
turnover in such positions, caused a shortage of experienced managers, especially in relation 
  
to quality and efficiency issues. These SOEs’ managers had no power to adapt their 
production to market conditions. For all these reasons, it was impossible to solve the 
continuous problem of matching SOEs’ outputs to market needs (Hinnebusch, 1995). 
Secondly there were Incentive Problems. The failure of managers to achieve their targets did 
not threaten the existence of SOEs, since failing SOEs were financially supported by the state 
for political reasons. Thus the managers of SOEs lost any incentive to increase output as to do 
so would only lead to higher targets in the following year (Tan & Peng, 2003). In addition, 
and in the absence of pressure or incentives to improve performance, little attention was paid 
to competitive strategies and ideas for innovation (Peng & Heath, 1996). Shop-floor 
employees also lacked incentives to improve performance. This is because the strategy of 
SOEs as ‘the property of the whole people’ turned into ‘the state property belongs to all and 
to none’, which led to the absence of motivation that usually comes from property ownership 
(Korani, 1992, p. 75). 
Moreover, the payment of low wages to SOEs’ managers and employees made them careless 
and obsessed with personal benefits. Shop-floor workers were unmotivated to care about their 
work quality or to cooperate with their managers in solving production problems, since they 
would be paid the same salary, irrespective of performance (Tung, 1981; Walder, 1989). The 
policy of maximizing employment and providing job security worsened the problem as public 
sector workers knew that they would not be dismissed for poor performance (Sukkar, 2007). 
Since skilled workers were paid more in the limited private sector, they usually chose not to 
work for the public sector. If they could not find job opportunities within the private sector, 
they emigrated. This situation turned the public sector into a provider of mass employment 
opportunities for unskilled workers or for those looking for easy employment opportunities 
depending on their political relationships (Hinnebusch, 1995). 
  
In the following sections, an explanation is provided for the events which triggered the 
economic reforms and led to the transition decision in Syria. The Syrian government’s chosen 
approach and path towards a market-based economy are then presented. 
3.  Triggers for Syrian Economic Transition  
The focus of Syrian SOE managers on achieving production volume targets meant that 
profitability and cost efficiency were not relevant. The prices of public sector products were 
simply marked up to give only a 10 percent return on investment. In line with Socialist values, 
SOEs in many industries, e.g. sugar, textiles and fertilizer, had to sell their products near or 
below their production costs. Therefore, financial returns in the public sector were insufficient 
to finance major industry upgrades and to fund the building of new plants (Hinnebusch, 
1995). 
During the 1970s, foreign investment was restricted and Syria tried to be economically 
independent through an extensive focus on industrialisation as a substitute for imports. Public 
investments during this period were financed by increasing oil revenues and aid from other 
Arab countries, while the public sector’s financial contribution to these investments was 
modest due to their insufficient returns (El-Laithy & Abu-Ismail, 2005). 
The focus on industrialisation during this period encouraged mass consumption rather than 
capital accumulation. This caused a dependence on imported capital goods without the 
development of the export capacity needed to earn foreign currency. The inefficiency of the 
export agencies, which mainly operated with a bureaucratic orientation rather than a 
merchandising one, deepened the balance of payments problems. This situation led to 
bottlenecks in access to raw materials and spare parts for machinery. Therefore, many public 
sector plants had to operate at low capacity when their out-of-date equipment broke down 
(Hopfinger & Boeckler, 1996). 
  
During the 1980s, oil prices fell sharply and financial support from the Arab Gulf countries 
was reduced greatly. As a result, the Syrian government’s investment declined, and its ability 
to create new work opportunities became very limited (Hinnebusch, 1995). As a result of all 
these problems, a deep recession struck the Syrian economy during the 1980s (El-Laithy & 
Abu-Ismail, 2005). During this recession, Syria experienced shortages of foreign exchange, 
increased debt and sharp falls in income per capita (Hinnebusch, 1997). Therefore, a strong 
rationale for liberalising the Syrian economy emerged in the early 1990s, especially after the 
termination of its relationship with the former Soviet Union following the latter’s collapse in 
1991. 
4. The Syrian Economic Transition 
The Syrian government responded to the fundamental problems of its Socialist economy and 
the 1980s economic recession in two major stages. These were firstly an incremental 
liberalisation stage and secondly a transition to Social Market Economy stage.  
4.1 The incremental liberalisation stage 
By the early 1990s, the Syrian government was convinced that economic liberalisation was a 
necessity. However, it believed that liberalisation must be adopted cautiously and that private 
sector interests should not control economic policy. In the Syrian government’s view, before 
major public sector reforms or privatizations could take place, liberalisation must develop a 
dynamic private sector that could absorb the unemployed workforce. In its view, some 
reforms could be made overnight, such as removing private ownership restrictions and 
liberalising markets (Weigl, 2008). However, many other reforms, like changing the structure 
and governance of former SOEs and equipping the economy with market-supporting 
institutions, would need years and perhaps decades to be accomplished (Buck, Filatotchev, 
Nolan, & Wright, 2000). 
  
The Syrian government’s cautious approach towards liberalisation was attributable in part to 
its awareness of the possible negative consequences of rapid economic liberalisation 
(Hinnebusch, 1997). The move to a market-based economy by undertaking reforms as fast as 
possible caused a dramatic decline in the level of economic activities among some of the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries after the Socialist bloc’s breakup, which led to 
unstable and oscillating economies (Rosser Jr & Rosser, 2004). This is ‘big bang’ approach to 
economic transition was first adopted by Poland in 1990 and was later followed by Russia and 
some of the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (Lipton, Sachs, 
Fischer, & Kornai, 1990; Roberts & Zhou, 2000; Sachs, 1993). 
The Syrian government’s approach could therefore be described as ‘gradualist’ and similar to 
the ones adopted by China and, later, Vietnam and Slovenia (Rojec, Šušteršič, Vasle, & 
Jurancic, 2004). These countries chose to deepen their transition gradually over time by 
applying incremental and partial reforms. They started by reducing the central planning role, 
liberalising prices and opening their door to foreign direct investment (FDI). Moreover, 
instead of following an aggressive program of privatization, other forms of ownership were 
allowed to emerge and spread, such as public-private ownership (Jefferson & Rawski, 1994). 
Therefore, an incremental liberalisation plan was designed in Syria which aimed to encourage 
private sector expansion. Incremental liberalisation started by offering concessions to the 
private sector through enacting new legislation and reforming the banking and taxation 
systems. Subsequently, the list of goods which the private sector could not export was 
shortened, and controls over foreign currency were reduced (El-Laithy & Abu-Ismail, 2005). 
Muhammed Al-Imadi, the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, was the main driver of 
the liberalisation process during this period. Previously, he had been persuaded by President 
Hafez Al-Assad to leave his work with the Kuwait Gulf Fund in order to lead Syria’s 
  
economic liberalisation and was promised full authority to execute the needed economic 
reforms. However, Al-Imadi did not get the required power and had to work patiently and, 
sometimes, to struggle for his reforms (Hinnebusch, 1997). 
Al-Imadi started by issuing a new investment law (Law No.10 for 1991) and showed interest 
in establishing joint venture (private-public) enterprises within the tourism and agriculture 
sectors. He had to struggle against Marxist MPs, who considered the stock market to be a 
lottery, to create a new financial market law. He also had to face Syrian trade unions’ worries 
about bankruptcy and their objections to his attempts to make the public sector operate under 
market rules, which focused on achieving higher financial profits. Furthermore, he sought to 
promote the Syrian economy’s integration into world markets by making progress on joining 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by stopping debt repayment exports 
to the former Soviet Union. Instead, he tried to encourage, or sometimes force, local 
merchants and industrialists to export to the West in order to generate more foreign exchange 
(Hinnebusch, 1997). 
During the first half of the 1990s, the private investments which took place in response to 
these reforms exceeded the state investment budget for the first time since the nationalisations 
of the 1960s. These investments, in addition to the discovery of new oil fields, bolstered the 
recovery of the Syrian economy and led to an average growth rate of 7 percent (Sukkar, 
2001). 
However, economic growth slowed to an annual average of 2.6 percent during the second half 
of the 1990s. This was because there were many weaknesses in the business climate that 
caused a fall in investment from 27 percent of GDP in 1995 to 17.6 percent in 2000. These 
weaknesses were in public administration, trade and exchange regimes, the regulatory and tax 
environment, and the financial sector (IMF, 2005). 
  
Oil formed 70 percent of Syrian exports and contributed around 50 percent of fiscal revenues 
between 2001 and 2004. However, the Syrian economy could no longer rely on its oil 
revenues to mask its weaknesses. Oil production fell and was not even able to meet the 
growing domestic demand in 2005. As a consequence, Syria became a net oil importer for the 
first time in 2006 (PRS, 2009). 
These facts made the Syrian authorities start to think of building the foundations for a 
growing non-oil economy. This can be seen clearly in the words of Dr. Adib Mayaleh, the 
governor of the Central Bank of Syria, who said, ‘We have to move from an oil economy to 
one based on banking, services and tourism’. He added, ‘Most importantly, we have to 
change the mind-set of Syrians from a Socialist system to a market system’ (Raphaeli, 2007, p. 
8). 
4.2 Transition to a Social Market Economy 
It is clear from the previous discussion that incremental reforms failed to make any significant 
changes to the performance of the Syrian economy. The Syrian economist Nabil Sukkar 
(2003), who was involved in modelling the Syrian economy during the 1990s, as part of the 
government’s economic consultation team, attributed this failure to the absence of a clear and 
coherent reform program. Furthermore, he argued that the incremental reforms were a 
response to the foreign exchange crisis, and were not motivated by a conviction that it was 
necessary to abandon the former central planning system and to move to a market-based 
economy. 
Moreover, the heavy reliance on external aid and oil revenues masked the serious problems of 
the Socialist economy and prevented Syria from achieving sustainable growth rates (Sukkar, 
2003). Therefore, Syria was not prepared to face the challenges of the 21
st
 century. Increasing 
globalisation and growing unemployment put more pressure on its economy. In order to 
  
handle these challenges, the IMF suggested that the contribution of private investment to GDP 
should be increased to at least 30 percent (IMF, 2005). 
The IMF Executive Board argued that generating new resources for growth and income to 
replace the depleting oil reserves and create new work opportunities to overcome 
unemployment would not be possible by following the same slow reform path. This was 
because ‘a slowdown in the pace of economic reforms could dampen investors’ interest and 
the prevailing political uncertainties will remain a source of vulnerability’ (IMF, 2006, p. 8). 
Similarly, Sukkar (2001) stated that achieving higher growth rates in Syria would not be 
possible by continuing to undertake hesitant reforms. In his opinion, attracting big local and 
foreign investments required strong reforms and a full commitment to a market economy as 
‘Big investments will not come in, if the door is half open and half closed’ (Sukkar, 2001, p. 
4).  
Therefore, the Syrian government became convinced that in order to achieve significant 
economic and social successes, the 10
th
 five year plan (FYP) (2006 to 2010) must be 
transformation – oriented and in June 2005 the Syrian Ba’th Party’s Congress adopted the 
Social Market Economy as its new ideology for the Syrian economy. The new ideology was 
based on the use of free market forces while stressing social support (Al-Dardari, 2006). 
Accordingly, the 10
th
 FYP was designed to move the Syrian economy in this direction and 
was intended to achieve a 7 percent annual real GDP growth, by diversifying the Syrian 
economy, increasing FDI inflows and extending trade ties. The Ba’th Party’s new ideological 
approach gave Syrian officials the authority and the courage to move further in the 
liberalisation process. Abdallah Al-Dardari, the head of the State Planning Commission at that 
time, and Deputy Prime Minister for economic affairs since 2005, said, ‘Whatever the 
  
negative consequences of globalisation, isolation is far more dangerous for Syria’ (Raphaeli, 
2007, p. 41). 
Moreover, the 10
th
 FYP adopted an ‘indicative planning policy’ instead of the previous highly 
centralised and compulsory planning process. The ‘indicative planning policy’ approach 
revealed the Syrian government’s preference for incremental liberalisation rather than the big-
bang approach. According to this policy, the state would only direct investment and market 
activities, and would not dominate or control them as it used to do. The government’s 10th 
FYP explained this policy approach by saying that the state would try to expand private 
investment opportunities and promote them. Accordingly, the government’s economic 
intervention would be confined to issuing the laws and regulations required for smooth 
market transactions, combating monopolies, regulating competition, providing a suitable 
environment for encouraging local and foreign private investment and ensuring that the 
different market players were socially responsible (Al-Dardari, 2006). 
4.3 Reform Measures after the Transition Decision in 2005   
The Syrian government’s plan to move to a more market-based economy needed a major 
effort to modernize and upgrade the private sector. However, the needed capital, advanced 
technology and experience were far beyond the capability of the private sector itself (Sukkar, 
2010). In this situation, FDI can play a vital role in bringing in many of these significant 
ingredients for private sector development and economic transition (Estrin, Richet, & Brada, 
2000). Moreover, FDI can speed up the transition process and contribute to a host country’s 
growth  through the various spillovers and the know-how transfers which can be generated 
from the advanced technology brought in by foreign enterprises (Stephan, 2011), and by 
encouraging organizational restructuring which can provide more effective corporate 
governance (Cipollina, Giovannetti, Pietrovito, & Pozzolo, 2012; Djankov & Murrell, 2002). 
  
Therefore, among the many issues which the Syrian government needed to tackle after taking 
the transition decision, the attraction of more FDI inflows was a major priority. By 2009, 
Syria had witnessed a 70 percent increase in its FDI inflows as a response to the new business 
opportunities resulting from the country’s growing economic openness and its better 
international relationships with other nations (UNCTAD, 2009). Moreover, in January 2009, 
an IMF report on Syria commended the annual average growth of non-oil GDP of 7 percent 
between 2004 and 2008, declining low government debt and the healthy level of foreign 
reserves. The IMF Executive Directors attributed the strong performance of Syria’s overall 
macroeconomic environment during that period to the government’s reforms, which aimed to 
move the Syrian economy in a more market-based direction (IMF, 2005). 
The institutional reforms conducted by the Syrian government can be classified into two 
major groups: policy reforms and business facilitation initiatives (Figure1). After the 
transition decision was taken in 2005, the most important type of policy reform in Syria was 
the liberalisation of FDI policies. This consisted of the reform of core rules and regulations 
governing the entry of multinational corporations and the operations of FDI and the standards 
of treatment accorded to foreign investors and the functioning of the markets within which 
they operate. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
For instance, from the early days of the 10th Five Year Plan (FYP) (2006 to 2010), the Syrian 
government took many measures to reform the financial sector with the aim of achieving a 
gradual implementation of market-based tools for conducting monetary policy, instead of the 
previous administrative tools. By 2007, a separation between state enterprises’ operations and 
the state budget was established. In addition, top marginal corporate taxes were reduced from 
65 percent to 35 percent during the same period (PRS, 2009). 
  
The most noticeable reaction to these reforms was the expansion of private banks. By 
September 2009, there were 12 private banks established in Syria which accounted for about 
24 percent of total Syrian banking sector assets (IMF, 2009). Two Islamic banks also entered 
Syria following the legislative Decree No.35 of 2005 which authorized the establishment of 
this type of bank in Syria (IMF, 2009). Some articles of Law No. 28 of 2001, which 
authorized private banks in Syria for the first time since 1963, and Decree No.35 of 2005 
were amended by Law No.3, enacted in January 2010. Law No.3 raised the needed capital of 
private banks from $60 million to $200 million, and that of Islamic banks from $100 million 
to $300 million. It also increased the allowable percentage of foreign ownership of private 
commercial banks from 49 percent to 60 percent, which gave foreign investors further control 
on their investment and, therefore, could encourage further foreign investment in the banking 
sector (PRS, 2010).  
In April 2006, the Syrian government enacted Law No.24, which authorized the establishment 
of private currency exchange companies. As a result, by the end of 2011, there were 10 
money exchange companies operating in Syria. In addition to that, in February 2007, the 
Syrian government issued Decree No.15 that permitted the establishment of financial, social 
and banking institutions with a minimum capital of $5 million to offer micro-financing and 
insurance services to small investment projects. In January 2010, the Saudi-based 
microfinance institution, Bab Rizq Jameel, was the first microfinance bank that obtained a 
license to operate in Syria (PRS, 2011). It should be noted that the majority of private banks 
and money exchange companies which entered Syria as a result of the above changes were 
Arab-owned since US sanctions made Western banks and other financial institutions less 
interested in investing in Syria (EMM, 2009). 
  
The Syrian government took many other initiatives to equip the Syrian economy with suitable 
legislative tools that could move it to a more market-based economy. These legislative 
initiatives tried to open the economy to private investment in general, and FDI in particular, 
and were necessary to regulate the functions and the relationships among economic players. 
For example, in January 2007, the Syrian government enacted Legislative Decree No.8 to 
replace investment law No.10 of 1991. The aims of Legislative Decree No.8 were to make the 
Syrian investment environment friendlier to the private sector by offering them various 
incentives. For instance, it allowed private investors (foreigners and locals) to own or lease 
the land and buildings needed for establishing or expanding their investment projects. The 
decree also allowed free repatriation of profits, invested capital and shares on condition that 
all tax responsibilities were met. If private investors were not able to continue their 
investment plans because of difficulties or circumstances beyond their control, Decree No.8 
gave them the right to repatriate all the foreign currency they had brought to Syria six months 
after its arrival. It also allowed foreign staff to repatriate up to 50 percent of their net income 
and full repatriation of end-of-service benefits. Furthermore, Decree No.8 granted to investors 
full exemption from paying customs duties on equipment that was imported to set up their 
projects, in addition to corporation tax deductions, if these projects were in one of Syria’s 
industrial zones (PRS, 2011). 
Most sectors became open for private investment in Syria as a result of the new regularity 
framework. Decree No.8 of 2007 and the previous Investment Law No.10 of 1991 covered 
and regulated most of these sectors including manufacturing (except water bottling, cotton 
ginning and cigarette production), agriculture, transport, health and services. In addition, 
many other sectors that were not covered by Law No. 10 and Legislative Decree No.8 were 
covered later by special legislation. For instance, in 2008 and 2009, the Syrian government 
enacted legislation that allowed the private sector, both domestic and foreign, to invest in 
  
extraction, mining, and quarry projects. In addition, on 14 November 2010 the Syrian 
government issued Law No.32 which allowed both foreign and domestic private sectors to 
invest in electricity generation and distribution projects. Foreign and domestic private 
investments in the real estate and tourism sectors were regulated by a separate law and tax 
framework and were managed directly by the Ministry of Tourism. Similarly, oil and other 
mining investments were covered by the Ministry of Petroleum’s rules and regulations. 
Licensing of private banks and insurance companies was the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance. Finally, private universities were coordinated directly through the Ministry of Higher 
Education, and private schools through the Ministry of Education (PRS, 2011; UNCTAD, 
2011). 
In April 2008, the Syrian government enacted Law No.7, which addressed competition and 
anti-trust issues for the first time. This law established the Syrian Competition Council which 
was responsible for controlling the Syrian Competition Authority, which was also established 
by the same law. The Syrian Competition Authority’s responsibilities were drawing, 
amending, developing and applying a general competition plan. In addition, the Competition 
Authority was responsible for investigating any breach of this plan by economic actors and 
for imposing suitable fines and other necessary actions. Law No.7 of 2008 also stated that the 
prices of goods and services would be defined by free market mechanisms and free 
competition rules. Moreover, this law prohibited cartels and economic entities from abusing 
their dominant position in the market in a way that could limit or prevent free competition. In 
addition, public sector enterprises were informed that they would no longer be allowed to 
operate as monopolies, especially when the project could be funded by foreign or domestic 
private capital (PRS, 2011). 
  
Efforts were also taken to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in 
Syria. For example, in March, 2007, the Syrian government enacted Law No.8, which 
regulated trademarks, geographical indications, and industrial models and designs. Later, in 
May 2008, Syria joined the Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement pertaining to the protection 
of international designs. In order to support these efforts, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) agreed in late 2009 to help the Syrian government by modernizing the 
Patent Office in Damascus. In addition, WIPO suggested translating their documents, 
publications and guidelines into Arabic and distributing them among small and medium-sized 
businesses(PRS, 2011). 
The Syrian government’s policy initiatives for creating a friendlier environment for FDI also 
included trade policy liberalisation initiatives and new international trade agreements. For 
example, a fully revised list of goods that could not be imported was issued in April 2008. 
Many goods were no longer banned from import (PRS, 2009). Moreover, in 2005, Syria 
joined the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). This agreement included the following 17 
Arab countries: Bahrain, Libya, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, 
Oman, Tunisia, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. As a 
result of the GAFTA, trade was fully liberalised among these 17 Arab countries including 
Syria (ECSEI, 2012). In addition to the GAFTA as a regional integration agreement, Syria 
signed a bilateral free-trade agreement with Turkey, which came into force in January 2007 
(PRS, 2009). Through this agreement and the economic co-operation between them, both 
Syria and Turkey aimed to create conditions which would encourage investments, especially 
joint ones, in both countries. For example, the agreement stated that trade and commercial 
transactions and payments between both parties should be free from any restrictions, such as 
those on currency exchange. 
  
All the institutional changes presented above aimed to create a friendly investment 
environment and a level playing field that would enable FDI to take place in the newly 
opening economy of Syria. Such institutional changes were accompanied by complementary 
measures to facilitate foreign investment undertaken in Syria (UNCTAD, 1998). Such 
measures included promotional actions, counselling, offering assistance to obtain required 
permits, accelerating the stages of the approval process and the provision of after-investment 
services. These measures were important for Syria, due to their role in eliminating 
bureaucratic barriers facing foreign investors (UNCTAD, 1995) and for improving the 
economy’s image as a destination not friendly to FDI (Wells & Wint, 2000). 
On 27 January 2007, the Syrian Investment Authority (SIA) was established by Article III of 
Decree No.9 to offer most of the above-mentioned business facilitations. This Authority was 
expected to play an important role in implementing the new investment policies and in 
achieving their goals by enhancing the investment environment (UNCTAD, 1998). According 
to the same decree, it was the responsibility of the SIA to simplify and facilitate investment 
procedures, to promote investment projects, to track projects’ implementation and overcome 
obstacles that hinder their implementation and continuation. Most importantly, the Syrian 
Investment Authority was required to establish a one-stop shop, which was responsible for 
registering, licensing, granting approvals and certificates required by legislation in force, 
following up on-going projects, identifying their constraints and coming up with solutions for 
them. 
5.  Conclusion 
Syria was in transition towards a market-based economy from the early 1990s. However, as in 
many other economies, the transition process was turbulent, complex, and sporadic. 
Moreover, institutional reforms were unpredictable during the transition period, which led to 
  
the emergence of a blurred legal framework, an underdeveloped judicial system, rigid 
bureaucracy and corruption, especially as informal institutions change much more slowly than 
formal ones and are not easily changed by legislation (Šimić Banović, 2015; Svejnar, 2002).  
Syria’s economic transition started cautiously following an approach which was based on 
incremental liberalisation. The cautious approach was attributed partially to the Syrian 
government’s awareness of the possible negative consequences of rapid economic 
liberalisation. However, incremental liberalisation failed to make any significant 
improvement to the Syrian economy due to the absence of a clear and coherent reform 
program. Moreover, in 2004, the Syrian government realized that it could no longer rely on 
oil revenues to overcome the problems of its economic policies. Therefore in June 2005, the 
government announced the Social Market Economy as its new ideology for the Syrian 
economy; and its 10
th
 FYP was designed to move the country in this direction. 
The Syrian government started the process of building the foundations for a Social Market 
Economy by equipping the country with market-supporting institutions following the path 
illustrated in Figure 1. This consisted of the reform of Syria’s core rules and regulations to 
create a friendly investment environment and a level playing field that could enable private 
investment in general, and FDI in particular, to take place in Syria. The reform process also 
included complementary measures to facilitate private investment. 
Despite its further transition being interrupted since 2011 by the ongoing conflict, Syria 
provides a case study of a transition economy from a region, the Middle East, which has not 
been explored before. Therefore, this paper helps to further our understanding of post 
Socialist transition economies. This paper also shows the distinctive features of the Syrian 
transition economy, such as the ameliorating role of oil and financial assistance from Arab 
  
Gulf, as well as its similarities to other economies, in terms of the rationale for and the path of 
transition.  
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